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DOES STATE NATIONAL BANK OF BIG SPRING V. GEITHNER
STAND A FIGHTING CHANCE? 
DEVON J. STEINMEYER*
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 Financial Crisis sent ripple waves through the domestic and 
global financial markets that will keep everyone on their toes for years to 
come.1 The crisis prompted Congress to act. After nearly two years of re-
search, hearings, investigations, and negotiations,2 President Obama signed 
into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act” or “the Act”).3 The Act has wide-reaching effects on 
nearly every aspect of the U.S. economy, not just the financial services 
industry.4
Congress’ passage of the Act was not easy and the debate over wheth-
er the Act is necessary, constitutional, or economically beneficial still rages 
today.5 A recently filed complaint in the D.C. District Court raises constitu-
tional challenges to numerous parts of the Act.6 If the plaintiffs in State 
National Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner (“SNB v. Geithner” or “SNB”) are 
successful, the decision could dismantle a large portion of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.7
*J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Certificate 
in Business Law. I would like to thank Professor Michael Wise for his assistance in helping me develop 
and articulate my arguments in this paper. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and friends for their 
unconditional support throughout law school. 
 1. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 
N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 7 (2009). 
 2. See generally Thomas L. Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 23 
BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS SEC. & COMM. LAW § 2A:19. 
 3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2012). 
 4. Khademian, A.M., The Financial Crisis: A Retrospective, 71 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
REVIEW 821, 841 (2011).
 5. See generally C. Boyden Gray, Congressional Abdication: Delegation Without Detail and 
Without Waiver, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41 (2013); Responsible Consumer Financial Protection 
Regulations Act of 2013, S. 205, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 6. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 42-54, State Nat’l Bank 
of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032, 2012 WL 4229466 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 20, 2012) [here-
inafter First Amended SNB Complaint]. 
 7.  See Paul Mirengoff, Major Lawsuit Challenges the Constitutionality of Dodd-Frank,
POWERLINE (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2012/06/major-
lawsuit-challenges-the-constitutionality-of-dodd-frank.php. 
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This note will address constitutional challenges to the Financial Stabil-
ity Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau (CFPB) raised in SNB v. Geithner and illustrate why the D.C. District 
Court should find in favor of the plaintiffs on some of their challenges.8
Part I will briefly describe the events that led to the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
provide an overview of the Dodd-Frank Act and the legislative history 
behind its passage, and provide a summary of the challenges to the Dodd-
Frank Act’s constitutionality raised in SNB v. Geithner. Part II will quickly 
address whether the parties in the suit have standing to bring their claims. 
Part III will address the Supreme Court’s current separation of powers ju-
risprudence, as it relates to the SNB Amended Complaint. Finally, Part IV 
will use SNB v. Geithner to test the constitutionality of the CFPB and the 
FSOC.
I. CAUSES OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CONGRESS’ RESPONSE
A. Brief Overview of the 2008 Financial Crisis
The 2008 Financial Crisis actually started in August 20079 after a 
slowing of the global economy and unprecedented decreases in U.S. home 
values.10 Relatively low interest rates during the period encouraged inves-
tors to look for high yielding, relatively safe (or so they thought) invest-
ment vehicles.11 Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) backed by 
subprime mortgages became commonplace in the market.12 A CDO is es-
8. For the purposes of this note, I will only address Counts I and III of the SNB v. Geithner
Amended Complaint. At the outset of my research process, only Counts I through III were included in 
the complaint, and for space and time constraints, the portions of the complaint that deal with the 
“Orderly Liquidation Authority” will not be discussed or analyzed. Brent Horton provides an in depth 
review of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” and its constitutionality. See generally Brent J. Horton, 
How Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority for Financial Companies Violates Article III of the 
United States Constitution, 36 J. CORP. L. 869 (2011). Additionally, during the writing the of this article 
the D.C. Circuit Court struck down the recess appointment of the three of the five members of the 
National Labor Relations Board. Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (June 24, 2013). Since Richard Cordray, the Director of the CFPB, was appointed at 
the same time as the NLRB members, it stands that his appointment was also unconstitutional; this 
obviates the need to discuss Count II. See Financial Regulatory Reform: GOP Senators Continue to 
Press Case for CFPB Structural Reform, CCH BANK DIGEST, Vol. 2013-23, Feb. 4, 2013, available at 
2013 WL 3836494; Timothy S. Crisp & Ryan N. Parsons, CFPB Powers Could Be Invalidated Follow-
ing Ruling On NLRB Recess Appointments, Intelligence, FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.foley.com/cfpb-powers-could-be-invalidated-following-ruling-on-nlrb-recess-
appointments-01-25-2013/.
9. William Poole, Cause and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 33 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 421, 422 (2010). See generally DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S
WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2009).
10. Poole, supra note 9, at 426.
11. Id. at 424.
12. Id.
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sentially a bundle of individual loans (i.e., home loans, car loans, credit 
default swaps, etc.) repackaged and sold to investors on the secondary mar-
ket.13
At the time, most investors and analysts generally accepted the princi-
ple that real estate would continue to appreciate and therefore extended 
loans to borrowers who did not have the income or assets to service the 
loan; lenders assumed that they would have the appreciated home as collat-
eral and could therefore recoup the loan amount if the borrower defaulted. 
However, home values reached unsustainable levels and began to fall, 
which in conjunction with increasing adjustable interest rates and a slowing 
economy caused many homeowners to default on their home mortgages. 
Furthermore, the homeowners were unable to refinance their homes be-
cause the value of their mortgages exceeded the values of their homes. 
When the individual creditors defaulted, the banks foreclosed on homes 
that were worth significantly less than the mortgage value. This decrease in 
value directly affected the CDOs that bundled and sold these mortgages.
Once it became apparent that many of the largest financial institutions 
in the world had massive exposure to mortgage-backed CDOs, the credit 
markets froze. Banks were not willing to or did not have the capacity to 
extend credit to other banks and financial institutions, and available liquidi-
ty in capital markets around the world dried up.
The financial crisis occurred in several waves.14 The first wave oc-
curred in March 2008 when financial markets, realizing Bear Sterns was 
over-exposed to risky investments, cut off the company’s ability to secure 
funding to maintain its operations.15 In order to keep Bear Sterns afloat, the 
U.S. Government provided an emergency loan to the company and bro-
kered a deal with JP Morgan to purchase the investment bank.16 The sec-
ond wave of the financial crisis occurred on September 15, 2008 when the 
U.S. government refused to bail out Lehman Brothers, a company much 
larger than Bear Stearns, forcing Lehman to file for bankruptcy protec-
tion.17 The third wave started the day following Lehman’s bankruptcy fil-
ing when lending institutions responded by effectively freezing credit 
markets.18 The Government’s determination that American Insurance 
13. Neal Deckant, X. Reforms of Collateralized Debt Obligations: Enforcement, Accounting and 
Regulatory Proposals, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 79, 80 (2009). CDOs offer varying levels of risk 
depending on the “tranche” each investor wishes to enter into, with each “tranche” being independently 
rated by credit rating agencies.
14. Poole, supra note 9 at 422-23.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Group (AIG) was “too big to fail” and its subsequent bail out of the com-
pany further exacerbated the credit crisis.19 Finally, after several months, 
the credit markets began to loosen and liquidity returned to the markets, but 
not after a huge decrease in economic activity and wealth across the 
world.20 Given the tremendous loss in net worth stemming from the finan-
cial crisis, it was inevitable that Congressional investigation and action 
would occur.
B. Response to the 2008 Financial Crisis
Immediately following the 2008 financial crisis and the bail out of 
some of the world’s largest companies, Congress set out to determine what 
caused the massive meltdown and how to keep another similar crisis from 
occurring.21 Congress’ answer was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.22 When President Obama signed the 
848-page bill,23 it became the most significant piece of legislation to target 
the financial industry since the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.24 Congress passed the Act to “promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, [sic] to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services prac-
tices, and for other purposes.”25 Along with countless new banking and 
financial industry regulations, the Act also created two new government 
entities.26 The Act is broken down into eight subchapters, with each sub-
chapter directed at a different issue that surfaced in the wake of the finan-
cial crisis. For purposes of this article and the SNB v. Geithner case, only 
the following subchapters are relevant.27
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 and What it Means for Joe & Jane Consum-
er, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 99 (2010-2011).
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2012).
23. The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21547784
24. Vitello, supra note 21, at 99.
25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. 111-203, Preamble, 
124 Stat 1376 (2010).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012) (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5491 (2012) (establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
27. For purposes of this article, the following Subchapters of the Dodd-Frank Act will not be 
addressed: Subchapter III (Transfer of Powers to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Corporation, and 
the Board of Governors); Subchapter IV (Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision); Subchapter 
VI (Federal Reserve System Provisions); and Subchapter VII (Improving Access to Mainstream Finan-
cial Institutions).
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1. Subchapter I: Financial Stability
Subchapter I of the Act established the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council. The primary purposes of the FSOC are to: (1) identify nonbank 
financial companies28 or bank holding companies that may become “sys-
temically important” and threaten the financial stability of the United States 
if they were to fail; (2) provide stability to financial markets and set the 
expectation that the Government “will [not] shield [companies] from losses 
in the event of failure”; and (3) identify new risks that emerge in the global 
financial market.29 The FSOC includes ten voting members,30 consisting of 
the heads of various other regulatory bodies and five non-voting members. 
The FSOC has the power to force the Federal Reserve, following a two-
thirds majority vote, to designate a nonbank financial company as “system-
ically important.” A so-designated company must fulfill stringent reporting 
and regulatory requirements that the FSOC and Federal Reserve, and nota-
bly not Congress, deem necessary. Additionally, the FSOC has the power 
to review and overturn any of the CFPB’s regulations and administrative 
decisions.31
2. Subchapter II: Orderly Liquidation Authority
The Act created a systematic approach for dismantling a nonbank fi-
nancial company whose default “would have serious adverse effects on 
financial stability in the United States.”32 In enacting this provision, Con-
gress attempted to signal that no company was “too big to fail,” and no 
matter what the interconnectivity or dependence that the market had on a 
company, the government would have a mechanism to liquidate the com-
pany.33
28. 12 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012) (providing definition of “nonbank financial company”).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
30. Voting members are: the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall serve as Chairperson of the 
Council; the Chairman of the Board of Governors; the Comptroller of the Currency; the Director of the 
Bureau; the Chairman of the Commission; the Chairperson of the Corporation; the Chairperson of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency; the 
Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board; and an independent member appointed 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having insurance expertise. 12 
U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a) (2012).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2) (2012).
33. Jamieson L. Hardee, The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor’s Perspective, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 259, 272-75 (2011).
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3. Subchapter V: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, seven agencies34 were involved 
in protecting consumers with respect to financial matters. With the passage 
of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB became the sole enforcer of the eighteen pre-
existing consumer protection laws,35 and the CFPB has the ability to prom-
ulgate new rules, as it deems necessary. Arguably, the CFPB is the most 
controversial portion of the Dodd-Frank legislation.36 The main point of 
controversy surrounding the CFPB is its structure: namely, whether the 
executive or the legislative branches have any meaningful oversight power 
in regards to the CFPB’s operations.
The Act meets an almost immediate constitutional challenge in the 
SNB v. Geithner lawsuit, the driver of this article, and to this lawsuit we 
must now turn.
C. The Facts, Parties, and Claims in SNB v. Geithner
One plaintiff, State National Bank of Big Spring, is located in Big 
Spring, Texas,37 with two other locations in neighboring communities. The 
bank, chartered in 1909, is a community bank with less than $275 million 
in customer deposits.38 Another plaintiff, 60 Plus Association, Inc. (“60 
Plus”), is a nonprofit senior advocacy group promoting free enterprise and 
less government for senior-related issues.39 Yet another plaintiff, Competi-
tive Enterprise Institute (“CEI”), is an organization dedicated to “advancing
the principles of limited government, free enterprise, and individual liber-
ty.”40 Just recently, eleven States (Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, 
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and West 
Virginia) joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs as well.41 SNB alleges various 
harms and damages resulting from the Dodd-Frank regulations. Specifical-
34. 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)-(7) (2012); Recent Legislation, Administrative Law—Agency Design—
Dodd-Frank Act Creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau-Dodd-Frank Act, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 2123, 2123 (2011) [hereinafter Recent Legislation].
35. 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (listing the agencies that transferred their “consumer financial protection
functions” to the Board of Governors).
36. Recent Legislation, supra note 34, at 2123.
37. Big Spring, Texas, is located on Interstate-20 in west central Texas, approximately five hours 
due west from the Dallas/Ft. Worth area.
38. Jeff Bater, Three States Join Suit Challenging Constitutionality of Dodd-Frank Reform Law,
99 BANKING REPORT (BNA) 492, 497 (2012).
39. About 60 Plus, 60PLUS.ORG, http://www.60plus.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
40. About CEI, CEI.ORG, http://cei.org/about-cei (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
41. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State Nat’l Bank of Big 
Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032, 2013 WL 1909751, at *1 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 19, 2013) [herein-
after Second Amended SNB Complaint].
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ly, SNB’s Amended Complaint alleges the following: (1) the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) violates the Constitution’s separation 
of powers; (2) President Obama’s appointment of Richard Cordray to the 
CFPB violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (3) the 
Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC) violates the Constitu-
tion’s separation of powers; (4) the Orderly Liquidation Authority granted 
in Subchapter II violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; (5) the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority violates the Due Process Clause; and (6) the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority violates the uniform law of bankruptcy pur-
suant to Article I, Section 8.42
The Plaintiffs have added various defendants including: (1) Secretary 
of the Treasury Timothy Geithner; (2) Director of the CFPB Richard 
Cordray; (3) Chairman of the Board of Governors Benjamin Bernanke and 
the other members of the Board of Governors; (4) the CFPB; (5) the Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council and its members; and (6) various other 
government agencies and directors of those agencies.43 Essentially, the 
Plaintiffs have created an exceedingly large defendant pool by naming 
anyone that plays a part in the Dodd-Frank regulations.
SNB argues that the CFPB and its Director, Richard Cordray, have 
promulgated rules that unduly constrain the bank’s ability to offer services 
to its customers (e.g., CFPB’s regulations forced SNB to drop its interna-
tional remittance transfer offerings).44 Additionally, SNB alleges that, be-
cause the CFPB can retroactively punish the bank for its lending practices, 
the bank is constrained in its ability to make business decisions without 
knowing what the actual CFPB regulations are, which will ultimately force 
the bank to abandon its consumer mortgage business until the CFPB regu-
lations are clear.45 Finally, SNB asserts that the FSOC’s ability to anoint 
certain financial institutions as “systemically important” provides these 
institutions with a direct cost-of-capital subsidy. This subsidy stems from 
customers and other banks’ views that a bank that is “systemically im-
portant” is less risky, and thus is able to obtain financing at a lower rate and 
pass the cost savings onto customers. SNB argues that this subsidy directly 
harms them because they do not receive the subsidy and thus cannot offer 
services at competitive rates.
CEI and 60 Plus each allege that the increased compliance costs asso-
ciated with the CFPB forces banks to pass costs to customers or drop ser-
42. First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at 6-8.
43. Id. at 12-14.
44. Id. at 8-9.
45. Id.
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vice offerings, which directly affects the ability of the members of these 
organizations to obtain affordable banking services (e.g., checking ac-
counts, mortgages, credit cards, etc.).46 Finally, the Attorneys General from 
the eleven States that have joined the suit claim that, because their States’ 
pension funds have investments with financial companies subject to the 
“orderly liquidation” provisions of Dodd-Frank, the States would only get 
cents on dollar for their investments in such a liquidation, and would be on 
the hook for any deficiencies in their employee pension funds.47
With a base-level understanding of the events that precipitated the 
Dodd-Frank Act and the main arguments and facts surrounding the SNB 
lawsuit, we can now proceed with the analysis of the claims alleged in SNB 
v. Geithner. Congress’ intent to consolidate the regulation of America’s 
financial markets and institutions and provide a more efficient, transparent 
body of regulations emerges as a common theme in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
However, in attempting to create this more coherent financial regulatory 
scheme, Congress violated several of the Constitution’s separation of pow-
ers provisions. As a threshold issue, it is unclear whether each plaintiff in 
SNB v. Geithner has standing to assert it claims, so a brief standing analysis 
provides a logical starting point.
II. WHICH PARTIES HAVE STANDING TO ALLEGE THEIR CLAIMS?
In order to engage the wheels of the judiciary, a plaintiff must allege 
sufficient facts to state an actual case or controversy.48 The case or contro-
versy requirement of Article III is one of the most important mechanisms to 
limit the courts, and it functions as a key element of the Constitution’s sep-
aration of powers.49 Both constitutional standing, under Article III, and 
court-imposed prudential standing rules limit a court’s ability to hear and 
decide a case.50
The Constitution first requires the plaintiff to show an injury in fact, 
which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjec-
tural or hypothetical.51 Second, the injury in fact must have caused the 
plaintiff’s injury. “[T]he injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent
46. Id. at 9-10.
47. Id. 37-38.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1
49. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
50. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
51. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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action of some third party not before the court.’”52 The third and final re-
quirement of standing is redressability, which, simply stated, means that a 
favorable decision for the Plaintiff by the court will benefit the plaintiff or 
cure the plaintiff’s injury.53
On the prudential side of the table, courts have developed three self-
imposed limitations on the granting of federal jurisdiction: (1) “the general 
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights;” (2) “the 
rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately 
addressed in the representative branches;” and (3) “the requirement that a 
plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law 
invoked.”54 In order for a plaintiff to have its case heard, it must meet both 
the “case or controversy” requirements of Article III and avoid the pruden-
tial limitations developed by the courts. The Court in Warth v. Seldin sum-
marized the idea of standing by saying:
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to 
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. 
This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court ju-
risdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions it 
is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of 
the courts in a democratic society.55
There seems to be a common theme running through the standing case 
law: if a court wants to get to the merits of the case they will find standing, 
and if they do not want to decide the case on the merits they will not find 
standing.56
With a cursory overview of the Supreme Court’s standing jurispru-
dence, we will proceed with a brief analysis of the plaintiffs’ standing in 
the SNB v. Geithner case. First, SNB likely has standing to enter the federal 
courts and pursue Counts I and II.57 SNB has alleged an injury in fact: the 
inability to provide banking services because of the Dodd-Frank regula-
tions.58 They have also alleged that the defendants caused their injuries, as 
the CFPB’s international remittance transfer regulations caused the bank to 
discontinue offering the services. Furthermore, SNB alleges that the 
52. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
53. Simon, 426 U.S. at 39.
54. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
55. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citations omitted).
56. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); Craig R. Gottlieb, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitu-
tional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1994).
57. But see generally Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032, 2012 WL 8017567 (D.D.C. 
filed Nov. 20, 2012).
58. First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶ 68.
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CFPB’s open-ended grant of power and the uncertainty surrounding the 
ultimate CFPB rules have caused them to stop offering services for fear of 
retroactive punishment. Finally, a decision in SNB’s favor would redress 
their harm, since they would be able to again offer services that they had to 
discontinue because of the enactment and promulgation of the Dodd-Frank 
regulations. SNB may not have standing in Count III simply because the 
FSOC has yet to designate any “systemically important” nonbank financial 
companies, so the controversy is not ripe.59
We will quickly dispense with the other parties to the suit because 
they are irrelevant to the analysis of SNB’s core claims and as such fall 
outside of the scope of this article. CEI and 60 Plus likely have standing, 
but the court could dismiss their claims as potential “generalized griev-
ance[s].” Michigan, Oklahoma, and South Carolina probably do not have 
standing to bring their claims because they have not incurred actual dam-
age; they only allege hypothetical scenarios to challenge the FSOC’s Or-
derly Liquidation Authority under the Dodd-Frank Act.60
For purposes of this article, we will assume that SNB does have stand-
ing to pursue Counts I, II, and III. Working off that assumption, Counts I, 
II, and III all raise separation of powers concerns and thus the next section 
will survey the Supreme Court’s historical and current separation of powers 
jurisprudence.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT SEPARATION OF POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has had a checkered past when it comes to pro-
nouncing a coherent and predictable analytical framework for separation of 
powers challenges.61 The Supreme Court’s decisions are very tough to 
59. “Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of 
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative 
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has 
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” Nat’l Park Hospitali-
ty Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 148–149 (1967)).
60. Specifically, each plaintiff alleges that “[t]he [State] is ultimately liable for the payment of 
pensions . . . and thus any loss of property rights or investment value [attributable to the FSOC’s Order-
ly Liquidation Authority] directly harms the State.” SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at 10-12. These 
plaintiffs could argue that the rules regarding orderly liquidation are clear. It is inevitable that another 
large financial institution will be forced into liquidation by the FSOC, so their injury is imminent. 
However, this is quite the stretch of an argument.
61. E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506, 506-08 (1989).
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synthesize in theory and even harder to apply in practice.62 This section 
will first discuss how the Supreme Court distinguishes procedural or struc-
tural separation of powers violations from substantive or theoretical separa-
tion of powers violations. Next, this section will zero in on three particular 
separation of powers challenges relevant to the SNB v. Geithner case.
A. Separation of Powers, Generally
The first three articles of the Constitution establish the basis of the 
separation of powers doctrine.63 The Constitution created a legislative 
branch with a Congress that has the power to make the laws,64 an executive 
branch with a President to execute the laws,65 and a judicial branch with 
one Supreme Court, and as many lower courts as Congress deems neces-
sary, to interpret the laws.66 Separation of powers is an inherently challeng-
ing concept to apply because there is not a single “separation of powers 
clause” like the Commerce Clause,67 Appointments Clause,68 Tax and 
Spending Clause,69 etc. This lack of a separation of powers clause requires 
courts to look at all of the applicable provisions of the Constitution that 
develop the United States’ tripartite system of government.70
When an act of one of the branches of government implicates separa-
tion of powers concerns, it is usually on a “you know it when you see it” 
basis. The inherent ambiguity of the idea requires attorneys, judges, and 
legislators to use their intuition to spot potential separation of powers viola-
tions. The Supreme Court cases dealing with separation of powers fall into 
two rough categories: (1) cases posing structural or procedural separation 
of powers concerns; and (2) cases posing substantive separation of powers 
concerns.71
62. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1517-18 (1991); Ryan D. Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional 
Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471 (2006).
63. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946, (1983)); 
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1989).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II.
66. U.S. CONST. art. III.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
70. Jack M. Beerman, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
467, 472 (2011); Elliott, supra note 61, at 508. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (“The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform 
to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single 
Articles torn from context.”).
71. Beerman, supra note 70, at 472.
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Courts strictly apply the separation of powers provisions when one of 
the key “structural aspects,” enumerated above, is violated. Separation of 
powers inherent in the Constitution is a product of the structure defined in 
the Constitution and the process a particular government action must fol-
low in order to become effective.72 The key structural and procedural as-
pects of the Constitution are:
[N]o simultaneous service in the Legislative and Executive Branches of 
government; independent election of the President and Congress; an in-
dependent judiciary with life tenure and protected compensation; the re-
quirement that all laws be passed by both houses of Congress and 
presented to the President, who has the power to veto them; appointment 
of executive branch officials, ambassadors, and the like by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate; the Constitution’s specifica-
tion of the President’s military and foreign affairs powers; and the impo-
sition on the President of the duty to faithfully execute the laws.73
When an act of one of the branches of government is challenged for 
violating the separation of powers, the challenge typically hinges on the 
meaning and application of the procedure by which the action was taken 
and not an overarching separation of powers theory.74
For instance, in INS v. Chadha,75 the Supreme Court effectively ended 
the concept of the legislative veto.76 A legislative veto refers to an act of 
Congress that overturns (i.e., vetoes) an act or decision made by the execu-
tive branch.77 Specifically in Chadha, the House of Representatives, pursu-
ant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), vetoed the decision of 
the executive branch to suspend Chadha’s deportation.78 The Court struck 
down the legislative veto provision in the INA because Congress did not
follow the “finely wrought and exhaustively considered” procedure of bi-
cameralism and presentment.79
Another example of the Court’s strict adherence to the structural sepa-
ration of powers provisions occurred in Clinton v. City of New York.80 In 
Clinton, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act81 because 
it essentially gave the President the authority to amend a statute without 
72. Id. at 474.
73. Id. at 475.
74. Id. at 474.
75. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
76. Id. at 956-58.
77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1700 (9th ed. 2009).
78. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 927-28.
79. Id. at 951.
80. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
81. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-92 (2000).
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approval from Congress, which is not an enumerated Article II power.82
The Court went to great lengths to differentiate the President’s power to 
veto an entire bill and return it to Congress from his power to veto individ-
ual line items without Congress approving or rejecting the changes to the 
bill; the Court said that the latter was tantamount to legislating.83 In both 
Chadha and Clinton, the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that a 
statute, which attempted to alter the key structural aspects of the Constitu-
tion, was unconstitutional.84
However, if Congress leaves untouched the Constitution’s procedural 
and structural guarantees, the Supreme Court is much more cautious to 
strike down legislation that only raises substantive (i.e., theoretical) separa-
tion of powers concerns.85 Morrison v. Olson86 is representative of the 
Supreme Court’s unwillingness to strike down a statute for only general 
and minimal separation of powers violations. In Morrison, the Court up-
held a general challenge to the Independent Council (IC) provision of the 
Ethics in Government Act, which Congress enacted in the wake of the Wa-
tergate Scandal.87 The important issue in Morrison was whether the overall 
scheme enacted by Congress violated the general tripartite construction of 
government.88 Under the scheme, a special D.C. District Court panel could 
appoint an IC to investigate “high-ranking Government officials for viola-
tions of federal criminal laws,” and the IC did not report directly to the 
Attorney General or any other executive branch member.89
In dismissing the constitutional challenge, the Morrison Court found 
that the IC Appointment Provisions did not: (1) increase the powers of 
Congress at the expense of the executive branch; (2) cause judicial usurpa-
tion of functions properly reserved for the executive branch; or (3) under-
mine the powers of the executive branch or tip the balance of power to 
Congress by restricting the executive branch’s ability to perform its consti-
tutionally assigned functions.90 The Court’s holding makes it clear that it 
will uphold a general separation of powers provision if only minimal in-
82. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.
83. Id. at 439.
84. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-25 (1976) (finding that the appointment of Federal 
Election Commissioners violated the Appointment Clause of the Constitution and thus determining that 
a general separation of powers violation occurred was not necessary).
85. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 476; Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Beerman, supra note 70, at 476.
86. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
87. Id. at 658.
88. Id. at 660.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 694-96.
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fringement of a branch occurs or if the branch retains sufficient control 
over a constitutionally assigned function.91 However, in a more recent case, 
the Court “recognized that the three branches are not hermetically sealed 
from one another, but it remains true that Article III imposes some basic 
limitations that the other branches may not transgress.”92
As the case law seems to suggest, it is helpful to break down the anal-
ysis into bipartite relationships when reviewing whether a statute imper-
missibly violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. These 
relationships pose three typical questions and will each be discussed in 
turn: (1) Did Congress pass a law usurping power belonging to the execu-
tive branch under Article II?; (2) Did Congress pass a law delegating its 
legislative authority under Article I to the executive branch?; and (3) Did 
Congress pass a law usurping power belonging to the judicial branch under 
Article III?
B. Did Congress Pass a Law Usurping Power Belonging to the Executive 
Branch Under Article II?
Congress has, at times, enacted legislation that went beyond the “leg-
islative sphere”93 and encroached on the executive branch’s power. To 
ensure that this encroachment does not occur, the Supreme Court has de-
veloped two basic restraints on Congress: (1) it may not “invest itself or its
Members with . . . executive . . . power”94 and (2) “when it exercises its 
legislative power, it must follow the ‘single, finely wrought and exhaust-
ively considered, procedures’ specified in Article I.”95
The first restraint, properly characterized as a substantive or theoreti-
cal restraint, was illustrated most recently in Bowsher v. Synar,96 where the 
Supreme Court found that the Comptroller General’s role under the Bal-
anced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 198597 unconstitu-
tionally usurped executive power from the executive branch.98 In the event 
91. Id. at 696. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 972-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the legislative veto did not take enough power away from the executive branch to warrant striking 
down the statute). See generally Matthew James Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme 
Court: One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961 (1995).
92. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011), reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011) (citations 
omitted).
93. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 
252, 274 (1991).
94. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
95. Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
96. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
97. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22 (1988).
98. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727.
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a budget deficit existed, the Comptroller General’s role was to review and 
make spending reduction recommendations of the program-by-program 
budgets submitted by the Directors of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).99 The Comp-
troller General reported his findings to the President who was then required 
to enter an order based on the Comptroller’s recommendations to the budg-
ets of all governmental agencies.100 The Court struck down the Comptrol-
ler General’s role because it was effectively an execution of the laws, 
exclusively reserved for the executive branch, but the President had no 
control over the Comptroller, only Congress did.101
Another purely procedural challenge is best exemplified in I.N.S. v. 
Chadha.102 As previously discuss, the Court found § 244(c)(2) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act unconstitutional because it violated the bi-
cameralism and presentment provisions of the Constitution.103 The Court 
reasoned that, even though Congress had the power to “establish an uni-
form Rule of Naturalization,” one house alone could not act in a legislative 
function to alter the rights of anyone except under express language from 
the Constitution, but that is precisely what § 244(c)(2) allowed Congress to 
do.104 The one-House veto of the Attorney General’s suspension of depor-
tation with respect to Chadha was a legislative act, and for such acts the 
Constitution mandated bicameralism and presentment.105 Some restraints 
have both procedural and theoretical separation of powers foundations.
For instance, the President has the power to appoint principal officers 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,106 which is key to his 
responsibility to faithfully execute the laws.107 Along with this power is the 
President’s “power to oversee executive officers through removal.”108 Alt-
hough the Constitution gives the President his removal powers, the Su-
preme Court has sanctioned limits on those powers by upholding 
congressionally crafted “for cause” removal requirements as long as those 
requirements do not “impermissibly burden[] the President’s power to con-
99. Id. at 717-19.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 740-41.
102. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
103. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
104. Id. at 953-56 (quotations omitted).
105. Id. at 958-59.
106. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a good overview of the Appointment Clause, see Matthew 
Hunter, Legislating Around the Appointments Clause, 91 B.U. L. REV. 753 (2011).
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
108. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (2010).
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trol or supervise” the executive branch.109 Although Congress has the pow-
er to enact “for cause” removal requirements on officers appointed by the 
President, the decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board places limits on this power.110
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court reviewed the congres-
sionally enacted scheme that prohibited the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) from removing Public Company Account Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) members except “for good cause shown.”111 Congress then 
insulated the SEC members by requiring the President to show “inefficien-
cy, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” to warrant removal.112 This 
double layer of protection made it so the President could “neither ensure 
that the [PCAOB’s] laws [were] faithfully executed, nor be held responsi-
ble for a [PCAOB] member’s breach of faith.”113 The Court found the “du-
al for-cause” restrictions contravened the Constitution’s separation of 
powers provisions by removing the President’s ability to faithfully execute 
the law.114
Although Congress has the power to construct inventive ways to legis-
late, it cannot do so in such a way that gives it executive-type powers or 
impermissibly removes the President’s power to oversee the executive 
branch. The next subsection will address potential issues that arise when 
Congress gives away its legislative authority.
C. Did Congress Pass a Law Delegating its Legislative Authority Under 
Article I to the Executive Branch?
1. Intelligible Principles
The idea of nondelegation “is rooted in the principle of separation of 
powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government,”115 and Con-
gress generally “cannot delegate its legislative power to another 
[b]ranch.”116 Congress does have the power to provide guidelines to other 
branches and administrative agencies, which allow those agencies to devel-
op and enforce the laws, as long as “Congress clearly delineates the general 
109. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988). See also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
110. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153.
111. Id. at 3148.
112. Id. at 3154.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3155. 
115. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
116. Id. at 372.
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policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this 
delegated authority” to enable courts to properly analyze and adjudicate 
disputes.117 The Court has coined this the “intelligible principle” con-
cept118 and has only struck down two statutes because they lacked an intel-
ligible principle.119 Thus, it appears that the “intelligible principle” stand-
standard is fairly low, similar to that of the “minimum rationality” test120
under the Equal Protection clause.121
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations provides a clear picture 
of the Supreme Court’s current non-delegation doctrine.122 Multiple private 
parties and several States brought claims in the D.C. District Court alleging 
that § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegated Congress’ legisla-
tive power to the Administrator of the Environment Protection Agency 
(EPA).123 “Section 109(b)(1) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air 
quality standards ‘the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requi-
site to protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety.’”124
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s findings that 
§ 109(b)(1) impermissibly delegated legislative power to the EPA because 
the language of the statute did not provide an intelligible principle to limit 
the EPA’s administrative authority to regulate.125 However, the D.C. Cir-
cuit refrained from striking down the statute as unconstitutional by assum-
ing that the EPA employed a “restrictive construction” of the statute.126
The Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the lower 
courts.127 The Supreme Court quickly dismissed the notion that an admin-
istrative agency could make an unconstitutional delegation of authority 
constitutional by simply declining to extend some of the power Congress 
delegated to it.128 Next, the Court found that the word “requisite” in the 
117. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
118. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
119. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (guidance providing 
that administrative agency must foster “fair competition” was not sufficient to uphold the agency’s
power to regulate substantially all of the U.S. economy); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 
430 (1935) (statute that provided absolutely no guidance for the exercise of discretion violated nondele-
gation doctrine).
120. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999) (discussing minimum rationality); City of 
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985) (same); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (same).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
122. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
123. Id. at 462.
124. Id. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1977)).
125. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 1038.
127. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (summarizing the holding).
128. Id. at 473.
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statute, which referred to the appropriate level of air quality standards nec-
essary to protect the public health, provided an adequately intelligible prin-
ciple for the EPA to regulate appropriately.
Moreover, the Court in Whitman specifically noted that it had only 
found a statute lacking an intelligible principle in two cases, Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.129
The Court seemed to suggest these two cases marked the “outer limits” of 
the nondelegation doctrine, and as such the Court would only strike down 
statutes that fell beyond those limits.130 However, the Court did leave the 
door open to a potential nondelegation challenge when it said, “the degree 
of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the 
power congressionally conferred.”131 This assertion creates a sliding scale 
approach to the intelligible principle doctrine where the greater the scope of 
power conferred to an administrative agency, the more intelligible Con-
gress’ principle must be.
2. Power of the Purse
Congress can also improperly delegate its constitutional right to enact 
appropriations bills. The Constitution places the “power of the purse”132
squarely in Congress’ hands.133 The “Necessary and Proper Clause”134 and
the “Appropriations Clause”135 define Congress’ power of the purse. Arti-
cle I, section 8, grants Congress the power to enact “Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the] Powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.”136 Moreover, 
“Article I, section 8 also grants Congress the obverse power . . . to prevent 
the spending of public funds except as authorized by Congress.”137 Finally, 
129. Id. at 474 (referring to A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), 
and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)).
130. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474 (providing a listing of cases and statutes that the Supreme Court 
upheld and conferring an intelligible principle). 
131. Id. at 475. See also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996) (“Had the delega-
tions here called for the exercise of judgment or discretion that lies beyond the traditional authority of 
the President, Loving’s last argument that Congress failed to provide guiding principles to the President 
might have more weight.”).
132. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 86 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“That the governmental 
power of the purse is a great one is not now for the first time announced.”).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
137. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988) (“If Congress 
could not prohibit the Executive from withdrawing funds from the Treasury, then the constitutional 
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the Appropriations Clause of Article I138 limits Congress’ power to expend 
funds to instances when it properly passes an appropriation bill.139 Con-
gress’ power to control the spending of the federal government is one of its 
most powerful tools140 and serves as an important check on executive 
branch actions.141
To sum up, if Congress decides to delegate some of its legislative au-
thority to the executive branch, it must tread carefully and provide adequate 
guidance, and in no case should Congress delegate its power of the purse. 
The final subsection will address the usurpation of the judiciary’s power.
D. Did Congress Pass a Law Usurping Power Belonging to the Judicial 
Branch Under Article III?
In determining whether a particular statute infringes on the judicial 
branch’s authority, the Court will look to whether the “institutional integri-
ty” of the judiciary is threatened.142 The Court’s review has not been based 
on “formalistic and unbending rules.”143 Rather, the Court has reviewed the 
extent to which the “essential attributes of [Article III] judicial power”144
are transferred to non-Article III tribunals, the level of influence or power 
the non-Article III tribunal has, the type of right being adjudicated, and 
Congress’ rationale for changing the typical adjudication process.145
grants of power to the legislature to raise taxes and to borrow money would be for naught because the 
Executive could effectively compel such legislation by spending at will.”).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
139. Stith, supra note 137, at 1349.
140. Id. at 1360; Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (“However much money may be in 
the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previ-
ously sanctioned. Any other course would give to the fiscal officers a most dangerous discretion.”).
141. See also, e.g., Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (“Boland I”
prohibiting CIA use of appropriated funds “for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicara-
gua”); Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (“Boland II” prohibiting 
the CIA, Department of Defense “or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelli-
gence activities” from spending “funds available” in support of the contras).
142. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC) v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
143. Id. at 851 (“Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coherence to this area of the 
law, they might also unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to 
its Article I powers.”). See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 
(1985).
144. The “essential attributes of judicial power” include “the power to issue final judgments, the 
lack of judicial review or review only on a highly deferential standard, the power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus and preside over jury trials, and jurisdiction over state law claims.” Beerman, supra note 
70, at 496. See also J. Anthony Downs, The Boundaries of Article III: Delegation of Final Deci-
sionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1032, 1042-45 (1985) (discussing the “essen-
tial attributes of judicial power”).
145. See, e.g., CFTC, 478 U.S. at 851; Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587, 589-93.
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For instance, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the 
Court set out to determine whether the Commodity Exchange Act146
properly empowered the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
to adjudicate state law counterclaims in a customer reparations action.147 In 
Schor, the Court upheld the CFTC’s authority to adjudicate state law coun-
terclaims because the CFTC only adjudicated a “particularized area of 
law,”148 and parties could choose whether or not to have the CFTC adjudi-
cate their claims.149 Conversely, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court 
determined that non-Article III bankruptcy courts could not, constitutional-
ly, adjudicate counterclaims arising in or under a Title 11 bankruptcy 
case.150 The Court distinguished Stern from its prior decision in Schor by 
pointing out that in Schor the CFTC was merely an agency, whereas in 
Stern, the statute created an entirely separate non-Article III court.151
In addition, when assessing the constitutionality of a given statute, the 
Supreme Court will look to any restrictions Congress places on the Article 
III court’s ability to review agency decisions. Administrative government is 
an ever-increasing function within our tripartite system, and its legitimacy 
is “inextricably intertwined” with judicial review.152 Not only does the 
ability given to Article III courts by congressionally-enacted statutes to 
review executive agency decisions provide a check on the executive and 
legislative branches, but it also prohibits rogue agencies from operating 
outside the confines of the Constitution.153 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized the right of Congress to prohibit judicial review but only in instances
where Congress provided “‘clear and convincing’ evidence” of its intent 
“to restrict access to judicial review.”154
The structure, jurisdiction, and procedures Congress crafts for a non-
Article III tribunal are of the utmost constitutional importance. Further-
more, when Congress does grant non-Article III tribunals the right to hear 
and decide issues, the availability of review and the standard of review 
146. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1936).
147. CFTC, 478 U.S. at 835-36.
148. Id. at 852 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 
(1982)).
149. The Court also discussed the adjudication of public versus private rights, the procedural 
aspects of the CFTC’s adjudicatory process, and the “weight of evidence” standard of review of CFTC 
Orders by the District Courts. CFTC, 478 U.S. at 852-54.
150. 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611, reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011).
151. Id. at 2615.
152. Sidney A. Shapiro, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the 
Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 395 (1987).
153. Id. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). 
154. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 141 (1967).
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authorized by Congress play an increasingly large role in the separation of 
powers analysis.
As illustrated by the length of the “brief” exposition of the separation 
of powers jurisprudence, the idea is complicated, and in general, prior case 
law only provides a rough framework for analysis. With an understanding 
of the separation of powers jurisprudence, it is now time to assess SNB’s 
claims.
IV. SNB’S SEPARATION OF POWERS CHALLENGES
The Dodd-Frank Act is an attempt by Congress to create new and in-
ventive ways to legislate and govern, and with respect to the FSOC, it did 
not undermine the Constitution. Unfortunately, the structure Congress en-
acted for the CFPB twists and transfers power in ways that violate the Con-
stitution. In terms of SNB v. Geithner, and with respect to the FSOC and 
CFBP, the following questions arise: First, did Congress usurp any power 
from the executive branch that would violate the Constitution’s separation 
of powers? Second, did Congress delegate too much of its own legislative 
power to the executive branch under the Dodd-Frank Act? Third, do the 
restraints or adjudicatory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act unconstitution-
ally usurp the Judiciary’s powers? The CFPB will be first to enter the con-
stitutional gauntlet.
A. SNB’s Assault on the CFPB
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, it became abundantly clear that 
Congress was going to act in some fashion. Most will agree that certain 
aspects of the CFPB’s purpose and objectives provide necessary consumer 
protections.155 However, by attempting to isolate the CFPB from political 
pressures and special interests, Congress created an entity that violates the 
Constitution’s separation of powers. First, Congress stripped the President 
of his ability to effectively control, review, and oversee the CFPB, an exec-
utive agency. Second, although the guiding principle Congress enacted is 
likely intelligible, and thus constitutional, Congress improperly delegated 
its power over the public fisc to the Director of the CFPB. Finally, while 
the deference afforded to the CFPB by the courts is constitutional, the 
combination of minimal executive branch oversight, almost no Congres-
155. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012); See also, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5878 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) 
(statement of Sen. Todd); Alec C. Covington, Fighting Yesterday’s Battles: Proposed Changes to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 299, 302-04 (2012).
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sional oversight, and only minimal judicial review creates an unconstitu-
tional independent agency answerable to no one.
1. Executive Branch Problems
The SNB v. Geithner Amended Complaint raises several executive 
branch separation of powers concerns. First, even though the CFPB is an 
executive agency,156 Congress has removed nearly all of the President’s 
tools to hold the CFPB accountable. No other agency, nor the electorate, 
has enough power to hold the CFPB accountable either. For instance, alt-
hough the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve157 ceded significant 
administrative authority to the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. § 5492 completely re-
moved the Board of Governors from the equation and thus insulated the 
CFPB from presidential review via the Board of Governors. Under Sub-
chapter V, the Board of Governors has no power to: (1) scrutinize CFPB 
adjudicatory actions; (2) appoint, direct, or remove any officer or employee 
of the CFPB; (3) reorganize the CFPB; or (4) approve or review any rule 
promulgated by the CFPB.158 The CFPB is a wholly separate, distinct, and 
independent executive agency.
With the Board of Governors removed, the CFPB is able to operate 
without meaningful review by the President, and “[t]his contravenes the 
President’s ‘constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the 
laws.’”159 This added layer of protection and autonomy granted to the 
CFPB is eerily reminiscent of the “dual for-cause”160 removal restriction 
with which Congress insulated the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB or the “Board”) under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.161
Although the CFPB is not protected by a “dual for-cause” removal 
provision, the CFPB’s protections are even stronger. First, the CFPB does 
not have a direct superior agency watching over it, like the SEC watched 
over the PCAOB. With regards to PCAOB, the SEC had the power to “ap-
prove the Board’s budget, § 7219(b), issue binding regulations, §§ 7202(a), 
7217(b)(5), relieve the Board of authority, § 7217(d)(1), amend Board 
sanctions, § 7217(c), or enforce Board rules on its own, §§ 7202(b)(1), 
156. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012).
157. The Board of Governors is made up of seven individuals that are appointed by the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to fourteen-year terms. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
158. 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(2) (2012).
159. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010) (quot-
ing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)).
160. For-cause removal is in contrast to at-will removal, where the President or superior officer is 
not required to show any reason for removing the principal or inferior officer. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3142.
161. 152 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (2002).
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(c).”162 Similar restraints do not hamper the CFPB. In fact, only the FSOC 
maintains any sort of supervisory capacity over the CFPB, and that super-
vision is limited.
The FSOC has the power to review regulations163 promulgated by the 
CFPB, but it can only overturn regulations if two-thirds of the FSOC mem-
bers believe the regulation poses a threat to the “safety and soundness” or 
“the stability of the [United States’] financial system.”164 The statute pro-
vides no guidance to the FSOC to make their determinations and very few, 
if any, cases, regulations, or scholarly articles address the “safety and 
soundness” standard, thus making it very ambiguous. Without a clear 
standard from Congress, it becomes nearly impossible to articulate a mean-
ingful standard to assess whether the “safety and soundness” of the U.S. 
financial system is threatened. A standard that is triggered only when the 
entire U.S. financial system is at risk is not really a standard at all, and as
such, the FSOC’s supervisory role is largely irrelevant.165
Next, Congress vested too much power in the Director of the CFPB 
with too little oversight. The President can only remove the Director “for 
cause,m” and although SNB does not necessarily challenge the premise of 
a “for cause” removal restriction, SNB does challenge the CFPB’s particu-
lar “for cause” removal restriction because the CFPB has only one Direc-
tor, not a board or commission of multiple leaders. From a practical 
standpoint, the CFPB functions more like an “independent agency” than an 
“executive agency.”166
For instance, the CFPB: (1) makes its own regulations; (2) provides 
interpretations of the statutes it oversees; (3) enforces and adjudicates dis-
putes under the statutes it oversees; and (4) has subject matter expertise in a 
highly particularized area of administrative law.167 These characteristics 
162. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158.
163. The FSOC does not have the power to review CFPB orders and decisions in adjudicatory 
proceedings. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2) (2012) (listing the duties delegated to the FSOC).
164. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a) (2012).
165. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 891-92 (2012); Alan 
Charles Raul, CFPB Lacks Constitutional Checks and Balances, THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:19 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/206583-alan-charles-raul-former-vice-
chairman-of-the-privacy-and-civil-liberties-oversight-board.
166. Congress has not provided a definition for “independent agency.” However, in 1980, it listed 
sixteen “independent agencies” in the Paper Reduction Act, and multi-member commissions or boards 
controlled all of those agencies. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The 
Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1137 (2000).
167. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 261-
62 (1988).
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are common of independent agencies.168 But, what is alarming is that only 
one person controls the CFPB, and the President can only remove the 
CFPB’s Director for good cause shown.169 The CFPB’s structure provides 
the Director with independence in adjudicatory decision-making, which is 
desirable, but other co-Directors do not moderate his decisions, nor is the 
Director monitored by a supervisory agency.170 The “for cause” removal 
restriction is fundamentally different than similar restrictions on other 
agencies for the simple reason that one person, not a group, controls the 
CFPB. This distinction is important because it transforms an executive 
agency under the control of the President into a hybrid independent agency 
that lacks the checks and balances of a commission-type leadership struc-
ture.171
Finally, one other provision of Subchapter V, which further insulates 
the CFPB from executive branch review, is troubling. Even though the 
CFPB is an “executive agency” by statute,172 the President has no ability to 
review or comment, let alone, approve “legislative recommendations, or 
testimony or comments on legislation” before the CFPB makes those rec-
ommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress.173 Furthermore, any 
views expressed by the Director or CFPB officer to Congress “do not nec-
essarily reflect the views of the Board of Governors or the President.”174
This lack of oversight is similar to that of the Comptroller’s position in 
Bowsher v. Synar, and the Court found that structure unconstitutional be-
cause the President did not maintain enough control of the executive agen-
cy.175 SNB’s Amended Complaint highlights and challenges several key 
provisions of Dodd-Frank that may be unconstitutional, and SNB has a 
good chance of prevailing on those challenges, which would basically dis-
mantle the CFPB.
168. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935) (discussing the duties of the 
Federal Trade Commission); United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1159-60 (S.D. Fla. 1988) 
(discussing the typical characteristics of independent agencies); George F. Fraley, III, Is the Fox Watch-
ing the Henhouse?: The Administration’s Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1240-43 (1996) (same).
169. GOP Senators Continue to Demand CFPB Structural Reform, 2505 Fed. Banking L. Rep. 
(Feb. 6, 2013), available at 2013 WL 3835802.
170. In Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, the Dissent’s key contention was that the SEC still main-
tained sufficient control over the PCAOB, and as such, the President also maintained sufficient control 
over the PCAOB. But as has already been shown, the CFPB does not have a big brother, like the SEC, 
to watch over it and keep it in line. 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3172-73 (2010).
171. Breger & Edles, supra note 166, at 1137. See Verkuil, supra note 167, at 260 (providing an 
analysis of the common and distinguishing characteristics of independent agencies).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012).
173. 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(4) (2012).
174. Id.
175. 478 U.S. 714, 731-32 (1986).
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2. Legislative Branch Problems
SNB also raises two legislative branch separation-of-power concerns. 
First, SNB challenges the constitutionality of the CFPB’s power to promul-
gate regulations and enforce laws that protect consumers from “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices.”176 Second, SNB alleges that 
Congress unconstitutionally tied its own hands by relinquishing its power 
of the purse.
SNB faces an uphill battle with respect to its nondelegation claim that 
the language “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts” in Congress’ directive to 
the CFPB was impermissibly vague and removed Congress’ legislative 
power. The Supreme Court has, so far, only found two statutes lacking an 
intelligible principle, that is, where an administrative agency could not 
reliably promulgate regulations based on the statutes.177
Unfortunately for SNB, 12 U.S.C. § 5531 provides an intelligible 
principle by which the CFPB can create regulations reasonably designed to 
protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.”178 Alt-
hough Congress conferred significant authority to the CFPB, the definitions 
Congress provided meet the relatively low “intelligible principle” standard 
in light of the case law in the area.179 Congress’ intelligible principles pro-
176. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012).
177. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Both of these cases were decided prior to the “Switch in Time That 
Saved Nine,” which marked a change in the Supreme Court’s voting that occasioned a more expansive 
federal government. See United States v. Rothacher, 442 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000-01, 1001 n.1 (D. Mont. 
2006); Alan C. Kohn, A Legal Essay: The Judicial Activism Myth, 67 J. MO. B. 106, 109 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Journal/2011/03-04/A%20Legal%
20Essay%20The%20Judicial%20Activism%20Myth.pdf.
178. Congress provided that “unfairness” must cause “or [be] likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers” that is unavoidable and that “such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.” 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2012). Congress also allows the CFPB 
to use public policy as one basis for determining unfairness, as long as it is not the primary basis. Id. An 
act or practice is abusive if it (1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a 
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or (2) takes unreasonable advantage of: 
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the 
product or service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting 
or using a consumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a 
covered person to act in the interests of the consumer. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
179. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (upholding delegation of 
authority to determine excessive profits); Am. Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90 , 105 (1946) 
(upholding delegation of authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or inequi-
table distribution of voting power among security holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 
(1944) (upholding delegation to Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and 
equitable, and would effectuate purposes of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); FPC v. Hope 
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to 
determine just and reasonable rates); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) 
(upholding delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing “as 
public interest, convenience, or necessity” require).
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vide the CFPB with sufficient guidance to promulgate adequate rules. 
SNB’s challenge to the CFPB on nondelegation grounds is weak at best.
SNB’s assertion that Congress impermissibly tied its own hands with 
respect to the CFPB’s funding is a stronger argument. The Supreme Court 
recently stated that the “separation of powers does not depend on the views 
of individual [Sessions of Congress], nor on whether ‘the encroached-upon
branch approves the encroachment.’”180 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that 
the power to appropriate money is vested solely in Congress, and the Con-
stitution does not allow Congress to transfer this power to any other branch 
or agency.181 But that is exactly what Congress did with the Act. The 
CFPB, through its Director, is allowed to set its own budget without con-
gressional, or any other entity’s, approval.182 The budget amount is capped 
at twelve percent183 of the Federal Reserve System’s appropriated funds, 
but that is the only restriction.184
Although the CFPB’s budget is transferred from the Federal Reserve 
System’s budget, which helps enforce the twelve percent cap, it does not 
help the fact that the CFPB is empowered to unilaterally appropriate its 
owns funds. In the future, even if Congress challenges the CFPB’s budget, 
its only course of action would be to shrink the Federal Reserve’s budget, 
which would shrink the amount but not the percentage available to the 
CFPB. This mechanism for controlling the CFPB’s appropriations is dan-
gerous because it potentially harms the Federal Reserve without the Federal 
Reserve having any control over the situation. Furthermore, Congress gave 
the CFPB a $200,000,000 rainy day fund: in the event that the CFPB 
spends more than it budgeted, all the Director has to do is submit a report 
to Congress and up to two hundred million dollars is available to the 
CFPB,185 with no approval required.186
In summary, SNB’s claim that Congress provided the CFPB with an 
open-ended grant of power without an intelligible principle to guide the 
CFPB’s regulations and decisions is probably not meritorious because of 
the adequate definitions Congress provided. However, SNB does raise 
180. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992)).
181. See supra notes 132-141 and accompanying text.
182. 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2012).
183. Adjusted annually for inflation. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(2)(B).
184. Federal Reserve System actual expenditures for 2011, the last year formally reported, were 
$4.4 billion. ANNUAL REPORT: BUDGET REVIEW 2012, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM 2 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/budget-
review/files/2012-budget-review.pdf.
185. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(e)(2).
186. Id. The two hundred million dollar cushion is available through 2014.
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legitimate concerns about Congress’ delegation of appropriations power to 
the CFPB, since the CFPB submits its budget for approval to no one, and 
Congress does not have a safe mechanism to control their funding.
3. Judicial Branch Problems
Finally, SNB’s Amended Complaint raises questions regarding the 
level of deference a reviewing court is required to give to the CFPB’s in-
terpretations of its rules.187 All CFPB decisions and actions are subject to 
chapter V of Title V of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),188 and
thus all final decisions are reviewable, first by the District Court and sec-
ond by the Court of Appeals.189 No constitutional concerns exist regarding 
this process. SNB only alleges one constitutional issue with respect to the 
appeal process: the level of deference given to CFPB interpretations.
Regarding any Federal consumer financial law,190 the reviewing court 
must defer to the CFPB “as if the [CFPB] were the only agency authorized 
to apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions of such Federal 
consumer financial law.”191 Normally courts afford Chevron deference to 
administrative agency regulations and interpretations when Congress leaves 
a gap in the statute, so it is unclear exactly what Congress was attempting 
to convey with this language.192
However, since the CFPB subsumed the consumer protection laws 
from eighteen other agencies, the provision likely means that Chevron def-
erence is afforded to all new CFPB interpretations, and all prior interpreta-
tions by the respective agencies are binding as if the CFPB issued the 
regulation or interpreted the statute. This language will also allow the 
CFPB to trump any interpretations by other agencies that are contrary to its 
own. Given that the Supreme Court has sanctioned legislative action based 
on Chevron-type deference in other agency schemes, there do not appear to 
be any constitutional issues here.
To summarize SNB’s challenges to the CFPB and the provisions that 
establish and guide the CFPB are novel, and some of them pass constitu-
187. First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 105, 138.
188. 12 U.S.C. § 5563 (2012). This section refers to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1966. 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012).
189. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2012).
190. Defined in 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14) (2012).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B) (2012).
192. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (“When Congress has ‘explicitly left a 
gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation,’ and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless proce-
durally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”)).
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tional muster. Unfortunately, the biggest problem with Congress’ attempt 
to protect the independence of the CFPB is that it failed to provide ade-
quate checks on the CFPB’s power. The CFPB operates on its own island, 
the President can only remove the Director for cause shown, and no other 
agency has actual supervisory authority over the CFPB. The CFPB is also 
single-headed, not multi-headed like other similarly situated independent 
agencies. Congress also removed its power to influence and control the 
scope of the CFPB by relinquishing its power of the purse. The Director 
sets his own budget, and as long as the Federal Reserve System receives 
funds, the CFPB receives funds. Finally, in a vacuum, the judicial review 
provisions of the CFPB are constitutional, but when combined with very 
minimal control by the legislative and executive branches, the entire CFPB 
scheme violates the fundamental idea of our tripartite form of government.
Thus it appears that SNB raised some winning and some losing argu-
ments as to the constitutionality of the CFPB. SNB attempts to weave simi-
lar constitutional arguments regarding the FSOC, but the powers Congress 
conferred to the FSOC do not raise the same concerns as those raised by 
the creation of the CFPB.
B. SNB’s Assault on the FSOC
SNB argues that Congress provided an open-ended grant of power 
(i.e., an unintelligible principle) to designate nonbank “systemically im-
portant” financial institutions (SIFIs) without proper judicial review and no 
third-party remedy to challenge the FSOC’s determinations.193 However, 
SNB’s claims fall short of establishing a violation of the Constitution’s 
separation of powers concepts.
First, Congress committed an entire section of the Dodd-Frank Act to 
dictate what the FSOC is required to consider and the process it is required 
to follow to designate a nonbank financial company as “systemically im-
portant.”194 Congress enumerated eleven principles, with multiple elements 
to each, which the FSOC must evaluate when making its designations. 
Furthermore, Congress requires the FSOC to work with other financial 
agencies when making their determinations, and ultimately, the FSOC must 
report to Congress and justify its determinations.
Second, the deference granted to the FSOC, and consequently the lim-
itations placed on judicial review, are constitutional because of the com-
plexity involved in determining which companies are “systemically 
193. First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, ¶207.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
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important.” A SIFI designation is appealable by the nonbank financial 
company receiving the designation, and the reviewing court can rescind the 
FSOC’s determination if the decision was “arbitrary and capricious.”195
SNB argues that the appropriate standard of review in an Article III 
court for an administrative agency’s final decision is whether the decision 
was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.”196 The omission of “otherwise not in accordance with 
law” from Dodd-Frank is curious, but the potential impact seems absurd: 
an FSOC SIFI determination could break the law? This is not possibly what 
Congress had in mind when it left out the phrase “otherwise in accordance 
with law.”
Furthermore, Congress can alter the standard of review of agency de-
cisions for compelling reasons,197 and prior case law supports a change in 
the standard of judicial review when the decision of the agency relates to 
complex financial concepts and markets and requires specialized expertise 
to fully understand.198 In most cases, judges do not, nor are they required 
to, understand what a “systemically important” nonbank financial entity is, 
and thus an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review is constitutionally 
permissible.
Next, SNB avers that it should, as a third party, be able to challenge an 
FSOC’s determination of whether a nonbank financial company is a SIFI or 
not, because a SIFI designation will work to lower the risk of that company 
and thus give it a cost-of-capital competitive advantage in the market. At 
the outset, the Act does not expressly forbid a third party from appealing a 
decision by the FSOC. Section 5323(h) speaks only of the right, of a non-
bank financial company receiving the designation, to appeal the determina-
tion, but 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof.” Since no decision interpreting § 5323(h) currently exists, SNB 
could attempt to challenge an FSOC determination, once one is actually 
made.
195. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h).
196. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
197. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 830 (2010); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 
43, 63-64 (1993) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
198. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986) (declaring that, when a court is reviewing a dispute 
that rests squarely in the expertise of the agency charged with making the decision, the court must 
afford the agency substantial deference); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 
U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (when a court reviews complex scientific issues, it must be “at its most deferen-
tial”).
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Assuming SNB can challenge a SIFI designation, its allegation that a 
SIFI will be viewed as “too big to fail” and thus receive government back-
ing in the event of financial distress, which will in turn lower the risk and 
cost of capital of that firm, is precisely what Dodd-Frank seeks to discour-
age, that is, allowing and perpetuating “too big to fail” companies.199 Thus, 
SNB’s argument must fail. The purpose of a SIFI designation is to monitor 
“systemically important” companies and limit their potential negative in-
fluence on the market, but in the event that a “systematically important” 
company fails, Congress made it clear that it would not bail the company 
out.200 Instead, Congress established the Orderly Liquidation Authority to 
ensure that a failing company is wound down with as little disruption as 
possible to the markets.201 Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly au-
thorizes the failure of “systemically important” companies, and thus a SIFI 
determination, and the potential for a government bailout, in no way reduc-
es the risk and cost of capital of a SIFI-designated firm.
Additionally, even if SNB’s proposition that a SIFI designation 
equates to an implicit understanding that the U.S. Government will bail out 
the company, the designation is still largely irrelevant, if one assumes fi-
nancial markets are efficient.202 If markets are efficient, then they already 
know which nonbank financial companies are “systemically important” 
(and would receive government assistance in the event of failure regardless 
of the Dodd-Frank provisions) and have thus adjusted the risk related to 
those companies. With that assumption in place, an FSOC “systemically 
important” determination will have no effect on its cost of capital, so an 
FSOC determination is largely irrelevant.
Overall, SNB’s Amended Complaint fails to raise sufficient separation 
of powers concerns related to the FSOC. Congress provided an intelligible 
principle that the FSOC can apply to designate SIFIs, and the lowered level 
of judicial scrutiny is warranted given the complexity of the SIFI determi-
nation process. While SNB’s right, as a third party, to challenge an FSOC 
199. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. 111-203, Preamble, 
124 Stat 1376 (2010) (“An Act To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for 
other purposes.”); but see generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and 
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011).
200. 156 CONG. REC. H5234 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Frank).
201. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-94 (2012). See Wilmarth, supra note 199, at 993.
202. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) assumes that securities reflect all available infor-
mation at a given point in time and are thus priced perfectly at that instant. Burton G. Malkiel, The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 59 (2003). EHM theory also as-
sumes that “markets do not allow investors to earn above-average returns without accepting above-
average risks.” Id. at 60.
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determination likely exists, SNB’s arguments are unavailing because of 
Congress’ creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority and the idea of 
efficient markets.
CONCLUSION
The 2008 Financial Crisis was a very trying time for the United States, 
and it exposed many weaknesses in our financial system. Congress set out 
to mend those weaknesses. In some respects it succeeded, but in others it 
violated the Constitution by defining administrative agencies that lack suf-
ficient controls. The SNB v. Geithner case attempts to expose those uncon-
stitutional provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, and has a chance to prevail 
where Congress has erred.

